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                     Abstract 
 Memory serves critical functions in everyday life, but is also prone to error. This article 
examines adaptive constructive processes, which play a functional role in memory and cognition 
but can also produce distortions, errors, or illusions. The article describes several types of 
memory errors that are produced by adaptive constructive processes, and focuses in particular on 
the process of imagining or simulating events that might occur in one’s personal future.  
Simulating future events relies on many of the same cognitive and neural processes as 
remembering past events, which may help to explain why imagination and memory can be easily 
confused.  The article considers both pitfalls and adaptive aspects of future event simulation in 
the context of research on planning, prediction, problem solving, mind-wandering, prospective 
and retrospective memory, coping and positivity bias, and the interconnected set of brain regions 
known as the default network.  
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In 1932, Sir Frederic Bartlett published his landmark volume, Remembering: A Study in 
Experimental and Social Psychology, which drew on evidence of memory distortions to refute 
the idea that remembering is a literal or exact reproduction of the past. Bartlett (1932) argued 
instead that remembering “is an imaginative reconstruction or construction (p. 213)” that 
depends heavily on the operation of a schema, a concept that he borrowed from the British 
neurologist Henry Head. Bartlett defined a schema as “an active organisation of past reactions, or 
of past experiences, which must always be supposed to be operating in any well-adapted organic 
response (1932, p. 201)”. He further emphasized the importance of “the organism’s capacity to 
turn round upon its own ‘schemata’ (p. 213)” during acts of remembering. 
The somewhat opaque idea of an organism “turning round upon its own schemata” 
became sufficiently controversial that Bartlett later tried to clarify the concept in some 
unpublished notes that have been made available by the Sir Frederic Bartlett Archives at the 
University of Cambridge (http://www.ppsis.cam.ac.uk/bartlett/NotesOnRemembering.htm). 
“There is probably no other phrase in Remembering that has received as much attention as the 
expression ‘turning round on one's own schemata’” wrote Bartlett. He went on to explain that 
“turning round” refers to cognitive activities that occur “whenever remembering demands more 
than the production of a fully learned response” – that is, strategic, voluntary, and constructive 
activities that are required to respond to a current environmental demand when automatic, 
learned responses are not elicited. Bartlett argued further that such activities are of great 
functional importance: “when some current situation demands an adaptive reaction, selection 
from, or reconstruction of, the organised past must be effected.” Despite the adaptive value of 
this constructive activity, however, “turning round” also has a downside, often resulting in 
“rationalisation, condensation, very often in a considerable rearrangement of temporal relations, 
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in invention and in general in an exercise of constructive imagination to serve whatever are the 
operating interests at the time at which the turning round takes place.” 
                    Adaptive Constructive Processes and Memory Distortion 
Bartlett’s elaboration of what he meant by “turning round” on one’s own schemata 
reveals an important property of human memory: some processes that contribute to adaptive 
responding also result in error. In this article, I call them adaptive constructive processes, which 
I define as processes that play a functional role in memory and cognition but produce 
distortions, errors, or illusions as a consequence of doing so. Adaptive constructive processes 
are not uniquely characteristic of memory.  For example, in one of their classic papers on 
judgment and decision making, Tversky and Kahneman (1974, p. 1124) observed that the 
heuristics people use when making judgments about the likelihood of uncertain events “are quite 
useful, but sometimes they lead to severe and systematic errors”, thus falling under the rubric of 
adaptive constructive processes. Students of perception have long argued that visual illusions 
result from the operation of constructive processes that contribute to the efficient functioning of 
the visual system (e.g., Gregory & Gombrich, 1973).  
Although the idea that memory distortions sometimes reflect the operation of adaptive 
processes can be traced to Bartlett’s (1932) work, and has been embraced by other researchers 
from time-to-time (e.g., Brainerd & Reyna, 2005; Howe, 2011; Howe, Garner, Charlesworth, & 
Knott, 2011; Neisser, 1967; Newman & Lindsay, 2009; Schacter, 1999, 2001), in general 
memory distortions have been viewed as indications of defects or flaws in memory. Consistent 
with this view, there is evidence that increased incidence of memory distortions is associated 
with various indicators of suboptimal processing. For example, people who are especially prone 
to disruptions in consciousness or dissociative experiences have also shown increased rates of 
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susceptibility to various kinds of memory distortions (e.g., Clancy, Schacter, McNally, & 
Pitman, 2000). More recent studies have linked memory distortion to low intelligence (Zhu et al., 
2010) and also to symptoms of post-traumatic stress disorder (Goodman et al., 2011). 
Such findings may appear to cast doubt on the adaptive perspective. However, Scott 
Guerin, Peggy St. Jacques and I (Schacter, Guerin, & St. Jacques, 2011) recently marshaled 
emerging evidence in favor of the view that some memory distortions do indeed reflect the 
operation of what I call here adaptive constructive processes (note that I use the term “adaptive” 
in this article to refer to a beneficial characteristic of an organism, and make no claim about the 
evolutionary origins of adaptive constructive processes; for discussion of this issue, see McKay 
& Dennett, 2009; Schacter, 2001; Schacter, Guerin, & St. Jacques, 2011). In our review, we 
focused on three memory distortions that we believe reflect the operation of such processes: 1) 
post-event misinformation, 2) gist-based and associative memory errors, and 3) imagination 
inflation. In the present article, I briefly summarize arguments concerning adaptive aspects of the 
first two kinds of memory distortions, and then elaborate on the adaptive constructive processes 
associated with the third. 
The misinformation effect pioneered by Loftus and colleagues (for review, see Loftus, 
2005) occurs when misleading information presented after an event results in distorted memory 
for the original event. Though misinformation-based memory errors have important practical 
consequences (Loftus, 2005), Schacter, Guerin, and St. Jacques (2011) suggested that they can 
be viewed as a consequence of adaptive updating processes that are crucial for the operation of a 
dynamic memory system that flexibly incorporates relevant new information (for recent evidence 
and related ideas, see Edelson, Sharot, Dolan, & Dudai, 2011; Hardt, Einarsson, & Nader, 2010; 
St. Jacques & Schacter, in press).   
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 Gist-based memory errors occur when people falsely remember a novel item that is 
similar to an item that they encountered previously, making their memory decision based on the 
gist of what happened (Brainerd & Reyna, 2005; Koustaal & Schacter, 1997). Associative 
memory errors occur when people falsely remember a novel item that is associated with 
previously studied items, as in the well known Deese/Roediger-McDermott or “DRM” memory 
illusion, where presentation of a series of words (e.g., candy, sour, sugar, bitter, good, taste, 
tooth, nice, honey, soda, chocolate, heart, cake, eat, pie) that are all associated to a nonpresented 
“critical lure” word (e.g., sweet) results in a high level of false recall or recognition of the critical 
lure on a later memory test (Deese, 1959; Roediger & McDermott, 1995; for review, see Gallo, 
2010). Such responses are rightly classified as memory distortions – people claim to remember 
items that they did not study – but these errors also reflect retention of useful information 
concerning the general themes or meanings that participants did encounter. Retention of such 
information can facilitate generalization and abstraction (e.g., Brainerd & Reyna, 2005; 
McClelland, 1995; Schacter, 1999, 2001) and in that sense can be considered adaptive. Recent 
evidence links associative false memories with creativity. Dewhurst, Thorley, Hammond, and 
Ormerod (2011) showed that susceptibility to DRM false recognition is predicted by performance 
on a remote associates task, which measures convergent thinking – a component of creativity 
that taps an individual’s ability to generate broad and numerous associations, and can thus be 
considered an adaptive cognitive process (for related evidence, see Howe et al., 2011). 
Additional evidence consistent with an adaptive interpretation of gist-based and 
associative memory distortions comes from neuroimaging studies that have documented that a) 
many of the same brain regions are active during both associative/gist-based false recognition 
and true or accurate recognition, and b) regions that are active when people engage in semantic 
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elaboration during encoding, which serves the adaptive function of promoting long-term 
retention, support both subsequent true and false recognition (for discussion, see Schacter, 
Guerin, & St. Jacques 2011; Schacter & Slotnick, 2004). Thus, both cognitive and neuroimaging 
evidence supports an adaptive interpretation of gist-based and associative memory errors. 
     Imagination Inflation and the Simulation of Future Events 
The third kind of memory distortion that Schacter, Guerin, and St. Jacques (2011) 
discussed within an adaptive framework is known as imagination inflation: imagining events can 
lead to false memories that the event actually occurred (e.g., Garry, Manning, Loftus, & 
Sherman, 1996; Loftus, 2003). Imagination inflation is typically viewed as a consequence of a 
failure in source monitoring operations that allow us to distinguish between events that actually 
happened and events we only imagined (e.g., Johnson, Hashtroudi, & Lindsay, 1993). There is 
little doubt that source monitoring failure does play a key role in imagination inflation. Arguing 
from an adaptive perspective, however, we suggested that imagination inflation also results in 
part from the role of a constructive memory system in imagining or simulating future events. The 
capacity to simulate experiences that might occur in one’s personal future is potentially adaptive 
because it allows individuals to mentally “try out” different versions of how an event might play 
out (Buckner & Carroll, 2007; Ingvar, 1979; Gilbert & Wilson, 2007; Schacter & Addis, 2007; 
Suddendorf & Corballis, 2007; Tulving, 2005). During the past few years, research in my lab and 
others has documented striking similarities between remembering the past and imagining the 
future (for reviews, see Schacter, Addis, & Buckner, 2007, 2008; Szpunar, 2010). For example, 
neuroimaging studies have revealed extensive overlap in the neural processes that are engaged 
when people remember past events and imagine future events or novel scenes (e.g., Addis, 
Wong, & Schacter, 2007; Addis, Pan, Vu, Laiser, & Schacter, 2009; Hassabis, Kumaran, & 
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Maguire, 2007; Okuda et al., 2003; Spreng & Grady, 2010; Szpunar, Watson, & McDermott, 
2007). Similarly, behavioral studies have documented striking similarities in the corresponding 
cognitive processes associated with remembering the past and imagining the future (e.g., 
D'Argembeau & Van der Linden, 2006; D’Argembeau & Mathy, 2011; Szpunar & McDermott, 
2008). Moreover, deficits in remembering the past are often accompanied by parallel deficits in 
imagining the future in various populations, including several patients with amnesia (for review, 
see Addis & Schacter, 2012), older adults and patients with Alzheimer’s disease (for review, see 
Schacter, Gaesser, & Addis, 2011), and patients with depression (Williams et al., 1996) or 
schizophrenia (D’Argembeau, Raffard, & Van der Linden, 2008). These similarities can help to 
explain why memory and imagination are easily confused: they share common neural and 
cognitive underpinnings (see also Johnson et al., 1993).  
Even more important from the perspective of adaptive constructive processes, Donna 
Addis and I have argued that these observations provide clues about the adaptive functions of a 
constructive memory system. Specifically, Schacter and Addis (2007) have put forward the 
constructive episodic simulation hypothesis, which holds that past and future events draw on 
similar information stored in memory (episodic memory in particular) and rely on similar 
underlying processes. Episodic memory, in turn, supports the construction of future events by 
extracting and recombining stored information into a simulation of a novel event. Schacter and 
Addis (2007) claimed that such a system is adaptive because it enables past information to be 
used flexibly in simulating alternative future scenarios without engaging in actual behaviors, but 
it comes at a cost of vulnerability to errors and distortions that result from mistakenly combining 
elements of imagination and memory (for related ideas, see Suddendorf & Corballis, 2007).  
In the remainder of this article, I will discuss further the process of imagining or 
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simulating future events from the perspective of adaptive constructive processes, considering 
both the vulnerabilities and adaptive functions of future event simulation. 
        Future Event Simulation: Some Pitfalls 
A central tenet of the constructive episodic simulation hypothesis (Schacter & Addis, 
2007) and related perspectives (Suddendorf & Corballis, 2007) is that the ability to flexibly 
recombine elements of past experience into simulations of novel future events is an adaptive 
process, sufficiently beneficial to the organism that it is worth the concomitant cost in memory 
errors that result from occasionally mistakenly combining those elements. From this perspective, 
simulating future events ought to confer discernable advantages on the organism. 
                Mispredicting the Future and the Planning Fallacy 
One problem with this view, however, is that considerable research indicates that future 
event simulations are themselves error prone. Consider, for example, predictions that people 
make about their future happiness and related hedonic experiences. People frequently 
overestimate or underestimate their future happiness across a range of situations, which Gilbert 
and Wilson (2007) attribute to the properties of the simulations that people use as a basis for 
predictions. Specifically, Gilbert and Wilson (2007) point out that simulations of future 
experiences are frequently unrepresentative, often capturing the most salient but not the most 
likely elements of an experience; essentialized, omitting some nonessential details that can 
impact future happiness; abbreviated, often overemphasizing the initial part of an event; and 
decontextualized, ignoring aspects of a future context that affect the experience of an event.  
Similarly, Dunning (2007) has highlighted the limitations of simulation (what Dunning 
refers to as “scenario building”) in the context of planning for the future. For example, the well-
known planning fallacy (Buehler, Griffin, & Peetz, 2010; Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) occurs 
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when people tend to underestimate the time that will be needed to complete a future task, ranging 
from an undergraduate senior thesis to income tax returns and holiday shopping (for review, see 
Buehler et al., 2010). Dunning (2007) summarizes evidence that people depend on simulations of 
how they will go about completing a task that are incomplete in critical respects and therefore 
contribute to the occurrence of the planning fallacy. Dunning (2007) argues that simulations can 
result in poor planning outcomes for a variety of reasons, including that people often rely too 
heavily on a few abstract features of the simulated scenarios, neglect alternative outcomes to the 
ones they simulate, highlight positive aspects of simulated scenarios while overlooking their 
negative aspects, and fail to take into account the reliability and validity of the information that is 
included in simulations (for related ideas, see Buehler et al., 2010; Kahneman & Tversky, 1979).  
While these observations clearly indicate that there are situations in which simulations 
can lead us astray (see Mathieu & Gosling, 2012, for circumstances in which predictions show 
relative accuracy), such errors may reflect, at least in part, the tight connection between memory 
and simulation (Gilbert & Wilson, 2007; Schacter et al., 2008). Considering the planning fallacy, 
for example, Roy, Christenfeld, and McKenzie (2005) discuss evidence that predictions about 
future task duration tend to be based on memories of past event duration. Critically, these 
memories sometimes underestimate the actual duration. If one mistakenly remembers, for 
instance, that completing one’s income taxes took an hour rather than an entire afternoon, then 
one may be unpleasantly surprised to discover that the task cannot be completed during the time 
one predicted would be sufficient to complete it. Morewedge, Gilbert, and Wilson (2005) found 
that people often make predictions of their future happiness based on atypical past experiences 
that are highly memorable to them. However, these atypical experiences do not accurately 
predict what is likely to occur in the future, and thus can lead to prediction errors.  
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                                     Instability of Future Simulations  
In addition to this evidence that future simulations are error prone, other studies indicate 
that the act of imagining a future event can alter the subjective likelihood that an event will 
occur, even though there is no corresponding change in objective circumstances that would 
warrant a change in subjective perception. This effect was first demonstrated when Carroll 
(1978) showed that participants who imagined that Jimmy Carter would win the 1976 
presidential election were more likely to predict that Carter would win the election over Gerald 
Ford, whereas participants who imagined that Ford would win were more likely to predict a Ford 
victory. Subsequent studies extended this basic finding to other kinds of events, such as 
imagining winning a contest or contracting a disease (for review, see Koehler, 1991).  
More recently, Karl Szpunar and I showed that repeatedly imagining specific, everyday 
future experiences – interpersonal interactions comprised of familiar people, locations, and 
objects – increases the subjective plausibility that the simulated experiences would actually occur 
(Szpunar & Schacter, in press). However, this increased plausibility was observed only for 
positive or negative emotional events (not for neutral events; see Szpunar and Schacter, in press, 
for discussion of possible cognitive mechanisms). While it is difficult to know whether an initial 
simulation or a repeated simulation provides a more accurate assessment of future likelihood or 
plausibility, these experiments illustrate that a critical aspect of simulating an emotionally 
arousing future event – its subjective plausibility – can change significantly even when there are 
no changes in objective circumstances that correspond to the changes in subjective plausibility. 
These and earlier findings raise the possibility that instability in future simulations could 
undermine their usefulness as a guide to predicting or planning the future. 
    The Default Network: An Antagonist of Goal-Directed Cognition? 
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As noted earlier, neuroimaging studies have shown that remembering the past and 
imagining the future engage many of the same brain regions. This common core network 
(Schacter et al., 2007), also known as the default network (e.g., Raichle et al., 2001; for review, 
see Buckner, Andrews-Hanna, & Schacter, 2008), includes medial prefrontal cortex, 
retrosplenial cortex, posterior cingulate, medial temporal lobe, and lateral temporal and lateral 
parietal cortices. The default network was initially identified in neuroimaging studies as 
increased activity in the foregoing brain regions during passive rest states compared with 
conditions in which individuals performed attention demanding, goal-directed cognitive tasks 
(Raichle et al., 2001; Shulman et al., 1997). In other words, default network activity showed a 
relative decrease during goal-directed cognitive tasks compared with passive rest states. These 
passive rest states were not themselves targets of experimental investigation, but instead were 
included as control or comparison conditions for the goal-directed cognitive tasks of interest 
(Buckner et al., 2008). In light of more recent research showing default network activity when 
people remember the past or imagine the future, it seems likely that during passive rest states, 
participants’ thoughts drifted off to past experiences or possible future experiences. Most critical 
for the present purposes, the observation that the default network was less active during goal-
directed cognitive tasks than during passive rest led a number of subsequent investigators to 
propose that the default network does not contribute to goal-directed cognitive processing and 
that its activity might even be antithetical to goal-directed cognition (for discussion, see Spreng, 
Stevens, Chamberlain, Gilmore, & Schacter, 2010).  
Consistent with these observations, Mason et al. (2007) reported fMRI evidence that 
activation in default network regions can indicate the occurrence of mind-wandering during task 
performance: default network activity increased when participants performed well-practiced, 
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goal-directed working memory tasks that were characterized by frequent incidents of mind-
wandering, compared with novel task conditions in which mind-wandering occurred less 
frequently. Moreover, increased activity in several default network regions during practiced 
(versus novel) tasks was positively correlated with self-reported tendencies for mind-wandering.  
These observations do not directly question the adaptive value of future simulations, and 
indeed hypotheses have been advanced concerning possible adaptive functions of the default 
network (see Buckner et al., 2008). Nonetheless, since future simulations are thought to be 
important for goal-directed tasks, the foregoing considerations may raise questions concerning 
their utility because they indicate that the brain network most closely linked with future 
simulation is also associated with mind-wandering activity that increases when individuals stray 
from performing a goal-directed task. Moreover, in most studies that have linked default network 
activity with simulation of future experiences, the simulated future events are not linked to 
formulating a plan, solving a future problem, or any other kind of goal-directed cognitive 
activity. Instead, they represent imaginary scenes or scenarios that might or might not occur to 
the individual within a particular future time frame (e.g., Addis et al., 2007; Addis, Pan, et al., 
2009; Hassabis et al., 2007; Okuda et al., 2003; Spreng & Grady, 2010; Szpunar et al., 2007). 
Therefore, these studies do not indicate whether the default network can contribute to goal-
directed cognitive activity. 
          Future Event Simulation: The Case for Adaptive Function 
The evidence considered in the previous section indicates that future simulations can be 
error prone, unstable, and associated with a brain network that supports off-task mental activity, 
thereby casting doubt on the adaptive value of the ability to simulate future events. Let us now 
consider evidence that supports an adaptive role for future simulations. 
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          The Default Network Can Support Goal-Directed Cognition 
In light of evidence linking default network activity to off-task mind-wandering, it is 
important that recent studies show that, contrary to early ideas, the default network can indeed 
support certain kinds of goal-directed cognition (e.g., Andrews-Hanna, Reidler, Sepulcre, Poulin, 
& Buckner, 2010). Consider a recent fMRI study from my lab led by Nathan Spreng (Spreng et 
al., 2010) that examined brain activity associated with two forms of planning. Visuospatial 
planning was assessed by the well-established Tower of London task (e.g., Shallice, 1982), 
where participants are shown a configuration of discs on a vertical rod in an initial position.  
Participants attempt to determine the minimum number of moves needed to match the 
configuration of discs shown in a goal position on another vertical rod, while following rules that 
constrain the kinds of moves they can make. Autobiographical planning was assessed by a novel 
task that was visually matched to the Tower of London task but required participants to devise 
plans in order to meet specific goals in their personal futures. For example, freedom from debt 
constituted one of the goals in the autobiographical planning task. Participants viewed the goal 
and then saw two steps they could take toward achieving that goal (good job and save money) as 
well as an obstacle they needed to overcome in order to achieve the goal (have fun). They were 
instructed to integrate the steps and obstacles into a cohesive personal plan that would allow 
them to achieve the goal. 
The fMRI results showed clearly that goal-directed autobiographical planning engaged 
the default network. Importantly, during the autobiographical planning task, activity in the 
default network coupled with a distinct network, known as the frontoparietal control network 
(e.g., Vincent, Kahn, Snyder, Raichle, & Buckner, 2008) that has been linked to executive 
processing. By contrast, visuospatial planning during the Tower of London task engaged a third 
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network – the dorsal attention network, which is known to increase its activity when attention to 
the external environment is required (e.g., Corbetta & Shulman, 2002) – that also coupled with 
the frontoparietal control network. These results suggest that the default network can support 
goal-directed cognition of a particular kind – autobiographical planning – and that it does so by 
working with the frontoparietal control network, which appears capable of flexibly coupling with 
distinct networks depending on task demands (for further discussion and additional data with 
older adults, see Spreng & Schacter, in press). 
A related study led by Kathy Gerlach provides additional evidence on this point (Gerlach, 
Spreng, Gilmore, and Schacter, 2011). Gerlach et al. (2011) conducted fMRI scans while 
participants performed a goal-directed task in which they generated mental simulations in order 
to solve specific problems that arose in imaginary scenarios. For example, participants were 
asked to imagine being left alone in a friend's dorm room, and trying on their friend’s ring, which 
they could not remove. They were then given the cue word “soap” to help them imagine a 
solution to the problem. Gerlach et al. (2011) found that, relative to a control task that involved 
semantic processing but not mental simulation, the problem-solving task engaged several key 
regions within the default network, including medial prefrontal cortex and posterior cingulate, as 
well as a region of dorsolateral prefrontal cortex that has been linked with executive processing.  
Converging nicely with these results and those of Spreng et al. (2010), Ellamil, Dobson, 
Beeman, and Christoff (2012) examined the generation and evaluation of creative ideas, using a 
fMRI-compatible tablet that allowed participants to draw and write ideas during the fMRI scan. 
Ellamil and colleagues reported that during creative generation, the medial temporal lobes 
showed increased activity; during creative evaluation, default network regions coupled with 
executive regions, including dorsolateral prefrontal cortex. 
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The foregoing evidence that the default network can support certain kinds of goal-
directed activity also fits well with recent cognitive evidence concerning the adaptive value of 
mind-wandering. Contrary to the prevalent idea that mind-wandering represents a kind of 
cognitive failure, explorations of the content of mind-wandering by Baird, Smallwood, and 
Schooler (2011) reveal that people typically focus on the future and engage in extensive 
autobiographical planning during mind-wandering episodes (for similar findings, see 
Stawarczyk, Majerus, Maj, Van der Linden, & D’Argembeau, 2012). Critically, individuals with 
high working memory capacity, a measure of executive processing skills, engaged in more 
future-oriented thought during mind-wandering than did individuals with low working memory 
capacity. These findings further support the idea that mind-wandering serves adaptive functions 
and are consistent with fMRI observations that both default network and executive regions are 
active during mind-wandering (Christoff, Gordon, Smallwood, Smith, & Schooler 2009). 
                 Future Simulations Can Benefit Goal-Directed Cognition 
The preceding evidence shows clearly that the default network, which underpins future 
event simulation, supports internally-directed cognitive activities that are associated with 
adaptive, goal-directed processing. Consistent with this view, behavioral evidence also links 
future simulations with planning, problem-solving, and related forms of goal-directed 
processing. Taylor, Pham, Rifkin, and Armor (1998) pointed out that mental simulations are 
well-suited to support planning and problem solving activity because they: 1) include specific 
information about people, places, and social roles that can be helpful to generating problem 
solutions; 2) frequently contain a causal structure that resembles an actual situation, and 3) may 
provide access to information that would be otherwise overlooked but is critical to planning.  
Studies by Taylor and her colleagues have shown that simulations can help college students to 
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plan and prepare for upcoming exams when their simulations include specific information about 
the steps they need to take to prepare for the exam (see Taylor et al., 1998, for review). More 
recent evidence indicates that simulations are useful when attempting to solve open-ended social 
problems, where different possible solutions to a problem need to be explored and evaluated. 
Sheldon, McAndrews, and Moscovitch (2011) reported that older adults, who tend to provide 
less detailed autobiographical memories and simulations of future events than younger adults 
(e.g., Addis, Wong, & Schacter, 2008; for review, see Schacter, Gaesser, & Addis, 2011) also 
generated fewer relevant steps than controls when simulating solutions to ill-defined problems, 
suggesting that without an ability to generate detailed simulations, the effectiveness of problem 
solving is reduced. The tight linkage between simulations and goal-directed processing has been 
emphasized by D’Argembeau and Mathy (2011), who reported that when people simulated 
future events, cuing participants with their personal goals facilitated access to episodic details. 
These observations led the authors to conclude that: “knowledge about personal goals plays an 
important role in the construction of episodic future thoughts (p. 258)”. 
Future simulations can also have beneficial consequences on decisions about the future as 
well as the likelihood of carrying out future actions. Consider the phenomenon of temporal 
discounting: people tend to devalue a reward according to the extent of delay until the reward is 
delivered (Green & Myerson, 2004). Boyer (2008) argued that a key adaptive function of future 
simulation is to allow individuals to represent emotional aspects of distant future rewards in a 
way that overcomes temporal discounting, producing less impulsive and more farsighted 
decisions. Consistent with this view, recent research has shown that when people imagine 
experiencing a reward in the future, they show an increased tendency to favor rewards that 
produce greater long-term payoffs, thereby countering the normal tendency to devalue delayed 
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rewards (Benoit, Gilbert, & Burgess, 2011; Peters & Büchel, 2010). For example, Benoit et al. 
(2011) instructed participants to imagine specific episodes of spending money in a pub at 
particular times in the future. Compared with a control condition in which they estimated what 
the money would purchase, simulating the future rewards biased participants toward accepting a 
larger delayed reward (e.g., $70 in 90 days) rather than a smaller immediate reward (e.g., $50 
now). Benoit et al. (2011) scanned participants during this procedure, and showed that effects of 
episodic simulation on temporal discounting are associated with increased coupling between 
activity in the hippocampus and prefrontal regions involved in reward representation (see also, 
Peters & Büchel, 2010). 
                 Future Simulations Can Enhance Prospective and Retrospective Memory 
Simulating future events can also increase prospective memory or the probability of 
carrying out intended actions in the future. This point has been demonstrated in studies of 
implementation intentions: plans that link an intention with a specific anticipated situation in 
which the plan is to be executed (Gollwitzer, 1999). Implementation intentions benefit 
subsequent prospective memory performance by increasing the probability that when the future 
context is encountered, the intended action is triggered (e.g., Chasteen, Park, & Schwarz, 2001), 
and recent evidence indicates that mental simulations contribute significantly to the effectiveness 
of implementation intentions (Brewer & Marsh, 2010; Papies, Aarts, & De Vries, 2009). These 
findings documenting beneficial effects of simulations on prospective memory complement a 
large research literature demonstrating that imagining carrying out various kinds of skills –
ranging from athletic acts to surgical procedures – can produce significant benefits on their later 
performance (e.g., Arora et al., 2011; Taylor et al., 1998; van Meer & Theunissen, 2009). 
Recent evidence indicates that simulating future events can also aid performance on 
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traditional tests of retrospective memory. Several decades ago, Ingvar (1985) argued that 
“memory of the future” – that is, remembering the contents of simulated future events – 
constitutes an important adaptive function because remembering what we have planned to do or 
say in an upcoming episode can increase the effectiveness and efficiency of future behavior. 
Although little is known about memory for future simulations, recent studies by Klein, 
Robertson, and Delton (2010, 2011) have shown that constructing simulations of possible future 
events constitutes a highly effective form of memory encoding. Their studies addressed research 
by Nairne and colleagues that had shown that encoding information with respect to its potential 
survival value results in greater subsequent recall and recognition than a variety of well-
established encoding procedures (for review, see Nairne, 2010). Klein and colleagues 
demonstrated that much or possibly all of the benefit of such “survival encoding” is attributable 
to planning processes. For example, when participants imagine scenarios in which they are 
stranded in grasslands without food, and encode a list of words with respect to their survival 
relevance, survival scenarios that involve planning produce superior subsequent memory to 
survival scenarios that do not involve planning; superior recall is also observed for scenarios that 
involve planning but not survival (e.g., planning a dinner party; Klein et al., 2011). This 
encoding benefit is specific to future scenarios: it is not observed when people encode 
information by calling up past scenarios or imagining “atemporal” scenarios (Klein et al., 2010).   
Although next to nothing is known about the neural processes that support encoding of 
future scenarios, a recent fMRI study by Martin, Schacter, Corballis, and Addis (2011) indicates 
that the hippocampus plays an important role. During fMRI scanning, participants imagined 
future scenarios comprised of people, locations, and objects that were extracted from 
autobiographical memories provided by each participant prior to the scan, and had been 
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randomly recombined by the experimenters. Memory for simulations was tested shortly after the 
scan by providing two elements of the simulated episode (e.g., person and object) and probing 
recall of the third element (e.g., location); a simulation was classified as “remembered” when 
participants recalled the third element correctly and as “forgotten” when they did not. Greater 
hippocampal activity was observed during construction of subsequently remembered than 
forgotten simulations, even when controlling for the amount of detail associated with each 
simulation (for discussion of related findings, see Addis & Schacter, 2012; Buckner, 2010; 
Maguire, Vargha-Khadem, & Hassabis, 2010; Schacter & Addis, 2009; Squire et al., 2010). 
                Future Simulations Can Enhance Psychological Well-Being 
The adaptive value of future simulations is also supported by research that has 
established that they can contribute to psychological well-being. For example, college students 
who simulated details and emotions associated with an ongoing stressful event reported using 
more effective coping strategies one week later compared with control groups (Taylor et al., 
1998). Similarly, in a study where women with first-time pregnancies were asked to simulate 
going into labor and arriving at the hospital on-time, more detailed and coherent simulations 
were correlated with increased subjective probability of a positive outcome and decreased 
amounts of worry related to the future event (Brown, Macleod, Tata, & Goddard, 2002).  
These findings are of interest with respect to the positivity bias that frequently 
characterizes future thinking (Sharot, 2011), because such biases have been linked to a number 
of adaptive processes, including emotional well-being, forming social bonds, productivity at 
work, and coping with stress effectively (e.g., Taylor, 1989). Further, recent research has shown 
that positivity biases are observed when people remember simulations of positive, negative, and 
neutral future events: details associated with negative simulations were more difficult to 
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remember over time than details associated with positive or neutral simulations, thus promoting 
recollection of a rosy simulated future (Szpunar, Addis, & Schacter, 2012). 
Finally, recent studies have revealed a benefit of future simulations with potentially 
important social implications: mentally simulating positive encounters with members of an 
outgroup, including individuals of a different race, age, or sexual orientation, results in more 
positive attitudes toward, and less stereotyping of, the outgroup represented in the simulated 
contact (Crisp & Turner, 2009). Simulated contact reduces anxiety associated with outgroup 
encounters (Crisp & Turner, 2009) and thereby positively impacts psychological well-being. 
               Concluding Comments 
Future event simulation clearly plays a functional role in memory and cognition, but also 
can produce distortions or errors, and in that sense constitutes a paradigmatic case of an adaptive 
constructive process. How can we reconcile the contrasting patterns of evidence reviewed in the 
previous sections? A key point arises from the observation made by such researchers as Gilbert 
and Wilson (2007) and Dunning (2007) that simulations of future events can result in inaccurate 
predictions regarding the future, and often provide an inadequate basis for planning, because 
they are incomplete in various ways. As a result, when a future scenario involves features or 
properties that are not represented when people imagine that scenario, but are relevant to how 
they will feel or perform when the scenario actually unfolds, individuals are very likely to be led 
astray by their incomplete, essentialized, or unrepresentative simulations. By contrast, 
simulations tend to be useful when they do represent critical features of an upcoming situation.  
This point is illustrated nicely by studies from Taylor et al. (1998) referred to earlier. In 
one study, college students who simulated the specific steps that were important for success on 
an exam (process simulation; e.g., simulating themselves in the act of studying) began studying 
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earlier, spent more time studying, and achieved a higher grade than did students who simulated 
how good they would feel if they received a high grade (outcome simulation). In a related study, 
students who constructed process simulations for an upcoming project that contained the steps 
critical to executing the project (e.g., imagining themselves gathering relevant materials and 
beginning to work on the project) were less prone to the planning fallacy than were students who 
constructed outcome simulations that did not contain the critical steps (e.g., how pleased they 
would be with the completed project). In both examples, simulations were useful only when they 
contained features that were critical to later task execution. 
These considerations suggest that our understanding of both the benefits and foibles of 
future simulations will be improved by attempting to specify the conditions that promote a match 
or mismatch between the elements of a simulation and critical features of an upcoming event.  
The simulation elements and event features could entail steps necessary to perform a task or plan 
for its execution, an unresolved personal problem, or feelings about pleasant or unpleasant 
personal outcomes. Understanding the factors that promote match or mismatch between 
simulation elements and event features will, in turn, depend on better understanding how people 
retrieve and recombine information from memory to represent a future event (Gilbert & Wilson, 
2007; Schacter & Addis, 2007; Tulving, 2005). More generally, studying adaptive constructive 
processes should help to provide a deeper understanding of the functions of memory, in line with 
the agenda set forth by Bartlett (1932) eighty years ago. Bartlett emphasized not only the 
constructive nature of memory, but also the functions that memory serves in such diverse 
processes as interpretation, problem solving, and social cognition.  A combined emphasis on 
constructive and functional processes should broaden our understanding of how memory links 
the past with the future. 
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